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There have always been fluctuations of production, employ-
ment, and prices in economic history. A lot of strenuous
work and intellectual efforts have been put into the study
of these fluctuations. Huge amounts of time series data have
been collected and indicators have been compiled to deter-
mine cyclical regularities and to provide information on the
cycle (see for example Burns and Mitchell, 1946). And many
attempts have been made to explain the forces behind the ups
and downs of economic activity (see Zarnowitz, 1985). Where-
as originally business cycle research was mainly directed at
understanding the fluctuations, research objectives became
more practical after the shock of the Great Depression. The
experience of the strong and protracted economic downturn
enhanced the call for a more active role of the government
in supporting economic growth and in maintaining a high
level' of employment. Keynes
1 "General Theory" (1936) de-
livered the theoretical basis for this policy.
In the postwar period, an era of "new dimensions of politic-
al economy" (Heller, 1966) seemed to have begun. The new
responsibilities of the government were written down in laws
2
like the Employment Act of 1946 in the United States and
the Law to Promote Stability and Growth in Germany (1967).
Economic research experienced a marked upswing, as the de-
mand for economic forecasts and economic advice increased
greatly. Economists were eager to supply those services and,
when computer facilities improved, a forecasting industry
developed quickly. The profession gained in size and reputa-
tion as long as economic policy was quite successful in
This paper has been presented at the Eighth International
Symposium on Forecasting, Amsterdam, June 12-15, 1988.
2
The law stipulates that "it is the continuing responsi-
bility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means ... to promote maximum employment, production, and
purchasing power".- 2 -
achieving its goals. However, in the seventies, when eco-
nomic policy began to fail to attain its objectives the
disappointment was great and much of the blame for this was
put on economists. In view of low growth rates and high
unemployment, economics became known again as the "dismal
science". The confidence of politicians and of the general
public in the accuracy and reliability of macroeconomic
forecasts was further reduced by the failure of most fore-
casters to predict the length and the depth of the recession
in the early eighties.
In this paper the performance of macroeconomic forecasts in
Germany is analyzed. After discussing the different uses of
forecasts, we will have a brief look at the main forecasting
institutions in Germany, at the history of economic fore-
casjts, and the forecasting methods used. The main part of
this, paper consists of an analysis of the forecasts of the
most important forecasting institutions. Finally some con-
clusions will be drawn concerning the practice of macroeco-
nomic forecasting in Germany.
II. The Different Uses of Forecasts
The science of forecasting is based on an understanding of
the causal factors that produce fluctuations in economic
activity and employment and changes of the price level.
Thus, forecasting is applied economic theory. The theo-
retical model used and the values assumed for the exogenous
variables of the model should be clearly spelt out. Given
these inputs the forecast should be reproducible in prin-
ciple. Therefore, the forecast error, i.e. the difference
between the predicted and actual value of the variable in
question, depends both on whether the underlying model is
"true" and on whether the exogenous variables are set cor-
rectly. Concerning the model or theory there is no agreement- 3 -
among economists on the "true" model. Instead, a number of
competing hypotheses are used to explain and to predict
business fluctuations. This requires a choice for the con-
sumers of economic forecasts, who simply want some infor-
mation on the most probable course of economic activity in
the future. While economic forecasts are used by politi-
cians, businessmen, and investors to make rational decisions
for the future, economists use them to discriminate between
true and false hypotheses. Milton Friedman (1953, pp. 8, 9)
has stressed the methodological importance of forecasts in
assessing different theories:
"..., theory is to be judged by its predictive power for
the class of phenomena which it is intended to "explain".
Only factual evidence can show whether it is "right" or
"wrong" or, better, tentatively "accepted" as valid or
"rejected" ... the only relevant test of the validity of
a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with ex-
perience."
A good theory is a reliable predictor. The size or the com-
plexity of forecasting models says nothing about the relia-
bility of the results. If several models provide the same
accuracy of predictions the one that can supply a certain
result with a smaller input of resources should be pre-
ferred. Friedman (1953, p. 41) indicates that whether a
theory is complex, big or realistic enough "can be settled
only by seeing whether it yields predictions that are better
than predictions from alternative theories." It is a matter
of economic research to use predictions as an instrument to
determine a model's ability to explain economic events.
Forecasts in this area do not directly aim at supplying
information about the future but can be viewed as a kind of
investment in macroeconomic knowledge. Macroeconomic fore-
casts are expected to provide some information on future
economic developments. Users of forecasts are primarily
interested in the accuracy of the forecasts and not in the
structure of the underlying model, its theoretical consis-- 4 -
tency, and its ability to explain past events. Competition
in the forecasting market focuses on forecasting re-
sults and not on the way in which they are produced. This
allows forecasters with very different approaches to compete
in the market. Most forecasts are based on economic models
of very different complexity and theoretical orientation
(conditional model approach). Some forecasters are using
vector autoregressive modeling techniques (VAR) which re-
quire no theoretical foundation. VAR-generated forecasts
represent a strong challenge to the conditional model ap-
proach (McNees, 1986). Other forecasts are derived from
polls. Consumers of economic forecasts who are mainly inter-
ested in reliable information on the most likely course of
economic events in the near future are often frustrated and
confused by the wide variety of predictions and the apparent
discrepancies among them. However, as in all competitive
markets the process of competition will lead to the dis-
covery of models with a superior forecasting performance.
The quality of forecasts is mostly judged by comparing the
relative size of the forecasting errors irrespective of
whether the approach provides an explanation of economic
events or whether the assumptions underlying the forecast
were correct. This does not mean that economic theory is
irrelevant for macroeconomic forecasts. On the contrary, it
is an important input in the production function of any
systematic forecast but it is not the final product. In the
following we will only deal with macroeconomic forecasts and
when analyzing the German experience with macroeconomic
forecasts we will do this by measuring the accuracy of the
forecasts given by different institutions.- 5 -
III. The Main Forecasting Institutions in Germany
Important suppliers of macroeconomic forecasts are the eco-
nomic research institutes. The five biggest institutes are
the DIW at Berlin, the HWWA-Institute at Hamburg, the Ifo-
Institute at Munich, the Institute of World Economics at
Kiel, and the RWI-Institute at Essen. All institutes belong
either directly to the public sector, like the institutes at
Kiel, Berlin, and Hamburg, or are quasi-public sector insti-
tutions mainly financed by the federal and state govern-
ments. Each institute normally publishes its own forecast at
least twice a year. In addition, in spring and autumn of
each year, the institutes prepare a joint economic forecast,
the so-called "Gemeinschaftsdiagnose".
Other institutes that produce macroeconomic forecasts are
the WSI-Institute at Diisseldorf which is funded by the trade
unions, and the IW-Institute at Cologne which is supported
by the German business community. Since 1964, the German
Council of Economic Experts takes part in the forecasting
business and publishes its annual report in November. These
domestic forecasts are supplemented by those of internation-
al organizations like the OECD and the IMF. Furthermore, all
major banks and business associations participate in the
forecasting debate and contribute their own business out-
JLook. There are also private forecasting companies like DRI
or Chase Econometrics but they play only a minor role in
macroeconomic forecasting in Germany. In this respect, the
German forecasting market is significantly different from
the US market. The main reason probably is that the macro-
economic forecasts offered by the economic research insti-
tutes and the Council of Economic Experts are more or less
free goods so that private production of these services on a
larger scale is not profitable. The dominance of public
sector institutions in macroeconomic forecasting is often
seen as an advantage because these institutions do not de-
pend on business interests. However, experience has shown- 6 -
that there is the danger that these institutions are exposed
to political pressures or that the forecasts are interpreted
politically. In the early eighties, for example, the govern-
ment heavily criticized the economic research institutes for
forecasting a recession on the grounds that this would con-
tribute to the downturn (self-fulfilling prophecy). And in
early 1987, before the general election when some institutes
forecast a continuation of the upswing, they were blamed for
supporting the government coalition by giving "unduly opti-
mistic" forecasts.
IV. Development of Macroeconomic Forecasting in Germany
In the immediate postwar period economic reports and busi-
ness outlooks were only prepared by the economic research
institutes. They mainly dealt with recent economic develop-
ments and gave a forecast for the next six months in very
vague terms. In 1950 four institutes presented a joint study
on "Viability and Full Employment". The purpose of the study
was to convey an idea of the magnitude of the task of re-
constructing the German economy within a reasonable period
of time, presumably the middle of the 1950s. The report is
of interest because it documents that the institutes greatly
underestimated the strength of the economic revival in Ger-
many.
Since 1950 the institutes have published joint economic
forecasts which are prepared for and financed by the Minis-
try of Economics . Up to 1962, the report contained only an
The joint economic forecast is prepared by the DIW (Ber-
lin) , the HWWA-Institute (Hamburg), the Ifo-Institute
(Munich), the Institute of World Economics (Kiel) and the
FWI-Institute (Essen). Until spring 1970 the Institute of
Agricultural Market Research (Braunschweig-VSlkenrode)
participated in the forecast.- 7 -
estimate of the GNP-growth in the next half year and a
qualitative forecast of other key variables. In mid-1962,
when the establishment of a Council of Economic Experts was
decided upon the institutes reacted to increased competition
by publishing a detailed forecasting table in their report.
Furthermore, the institutes lengthened the forecasting hori-
zon by giving a forecast for the entire next year in the
year-end report. Recently, the forecasting horizon for the
outlook prepared in spring each year has been lengthened
till the end of the following year. In its first report (in
November 1964) the Council of Economic Exports published a
forecast for the next half year only, but in the following
reports a forecast was presented for the next calendar year
as a whole. In 1967, the Law to Promote Stability and Growth
passed Parliament; it stipulates that the government submits
at the beginning of each year its Annual Economic Report
including a projection for the next 12 months. All these
institutions prepare forecasts only for entire calendar
years or for half years; up to now there is no regular fore-
cast on a quarterly basis .
The recessions of 1974/75 and of the early eighties as well
as the drastic increase in unemployment have intensified the
debate on the appropriate economic policy and have increased
the demand for and the attention paid to macroeconomic fore-
casts. Since then, more and more institutions, like banks,
the chambers of industry and commerce, associations of in-
dustry etc., began to publish economic reports, surveys, and
business outlooks and used the opportunity to present their
views on economic policy issues.
Some private suppliers of forecasts, e.g. DRI, produce
quarterly predictions.- 8 -
V. Forecasting Methods in Germany
The different German forecasting institutions rely on dif-
ferent theoretical foundations and forecasting techniques.
Most institutions tend to prefer informal approaches. At
first, this might seem inferior to the more formal approach
of most Anglo-Saxon forecasters. However, the use of a large
econometric model is not equivalent to more clarity about
the theoretical basis. In fact, in many cases model equa-
tions are determined on an ad-hoc basis and do not follow
from theory. In addition, models are treated with tender
loving care to improve the fit. As a result there are a lot
of add-factors and dummies which make it impossible to dis-
till the theoretical content of the model. According to a
survey on econometric forecasting models in the United
States the judgemental component amounts to approximately 30
percent (McNees, Ries, 1983) . The German economic research
institutes have an econometric model too, and there is even
a joint econometric model which has been developed for the
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose. However, these models are rarely used
to produce forecasts, they are mainly applied for simula-
tions of various policy alternatives and to check the con-
sistency of the forecast.
As to the theoretical basis there are considerable differen-
ces. The DIW has a pronounced Keynesian orientation. The
Ifo-Institute combines Keynesian analysis with surveys on
business sentiments and on investment plans, while Essen,
Hamburg, and Kiel have a neoclassical orientation in common.
Concerning short term economic forecasts, Kiel is known for
its straightforward monetarist approach (Trapp, 1976; Lang-
feldt, 1983) . According to the Kiel model changes in real
domestic expenditures (real GNP minus exports plus imports)
depend on current and lagged changes of narrow money (Ml)
and of the price index of domestic expenditures. For annual- 9 -
data the income velocity of narrow money has proven to be
stable enough to use this approach for forecasting purposes.
Exports are estimated by means of an export equation (Fle-
mig, 1984) . The exogenous variables in the export function
are industrial production abroad, the real effective ex-
change rate, domestic industrial production and a trend
variable. The elasticity of exports with respect to indus-
trial production abroad is approximately 1, for the real
effective exchange rate the elasticity is -.5 and for
domestic industrial production -.33.
It should be noted that the forecasts of the Kiel Institute
do not consist of a straightforward application of the two
equations. The forecasts given by the models are used as an
input and are supplemented by further (informal) considera-
tions including the influence of fiscal policy and of wage
policy. In the next chapter we will look at how accurate the
Kiel forecasts have been on average and compare the forecast
errors with those of other forecasting institutions.
VI. The Track Record of Macroeconomic Forecasts in Germany
Macroeconomic forecasts are mainly used for budgeting pur-
poses and for production and investment plans. Whether such
plans or projections can be executed as expected depends
partially on the accuracy of the forecast. Therefore, fore-
cast errors are quite important for the users of forecasts.
Especially, when the economic reality turns out to be less
favorable than was predicted and widely expected, fore-
casters are often harshly criticised (Krumper, 1988). How-
ever, individual forecast errors do not allow a well based
judgement on the quality of forecasts.
In the following, the accuracy of forecasts over a. suffi-
ciently long period of time is measured by the average dif-- 10 -
ference between the predicted and the actual value or rate
of change of the variable in question. Table 1 shows the
accuracy of forecasts made by several German forecasting
institutions concerning the most important variables in the
•National Income Accounts (NIA) . The analysis includes the
projections of the Kiel Institute of World Economics (Insti-
tut fur Weltwirtschaft, IfW), of the joint forecast of the
five leading economic research institutes (Gemeinschafts-
diagnose, GD), of the Council of Economic Experts (Sachver-
stSndigenrat, SVR) and of the federal government (Jahres-
2
wirtschaftsbericht, JWB). The comparison is based on yearly
forecasts done at the end of the previous year or, as in the
case of the government, in January of the current year. In
fact, several of these institutions publish more than one
forecast for the next year in the course of time. In the
public debate, however, most attention is paid to the fore-
casts for the next year which are released at the end of the
year.
Annual forecast errors were calculated as differences bet-
ween forecast and actual rates of growth. If the forecasting
institution published only a range, the mean value of this
range was taken. The Kiel Institute has published quantita-
tive forecasts for the main aggregates of the national ac-
counts on a regular basis only since 1976. Therefore, the
period of investigation includes the years 1976 to 1987 .
For the compilation of forecast errors three different con-
cepts have been used. The average forecast error (AE) is
A table with all forecasts and the corresponding NIA-data
is given in the appendix.
2
Until 1986 the government projected growth rates of the
different components on the expenditure side only in nomi-
nal terms. They were therefore excluded from the analysis.
Thus, for the JWB there are no forecasting errors for the
GNP components in volume terms.
For a similar investigation including 1976-1985 compare
Langfeldt, Trapp (1986) .- 11 -
Table 1 - The Accuracy of Macroeoonomic Forecasts in the Federal Republic of Germany 1976-1987 - Average Annual Devia-
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Source: Arbeitsgeme'inschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute, Die Lageder Weltwirtschaft
und der deutschen Wirtschaft. - Jahresgutachten des SachverstSndigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung. - Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Die Weltwirtschaft. - Jahreswirtschaftsbericht der
Bundesregierung. - Own calculations.- 12 -
used to investigate whether the forecasts show a systematic
bias. It provides information on the cumulative forecast
error, in the calculation of which positive and negative
errors cancel out. However, if one is interested in the
short-term forecasting ability the AE is not a useful cri-
terion. For this purpose the average absolute error (AAE),
which represents an unweighted average of the absolute fore-
cast errors, is more appropriate. In practice, users of
forecasts often want to protect themselves against large in-
dividual errors. Therefore the root mean square error (RMSE)
which puts greater weight on large errors is also calculat-
ed.
The NIA-data are revised several times by the Statistical
Office. Sometimes the forecasting error depends crucially on
which official estimate is taken as a reference. Therefore,
prediction errors are calculated with respect to the first
estimate of the Statistical Office (published in January of
the following year), to the first revised estimate (pub-
lished in March of the following year) , and to the final
data.
A comparison of the forecast errors in table 1 shows that
the statistical reference system is important for the size
of the forecast error. The relative forecasting record of
the different forecasting institutions, however, is hardly
changed. In the following analysis we will concentrate on
forecast errors calculated by using the official NIA-esti-
mates after the first revision. In March of the following
year there seems to be a reasonably reliable data basis of
the preceding year. The latest available estimates might
include an even broader data basis, however, they also
reflect changes resulting from the choice of a new base
year. Moreover, since they are published with a considerable
lag, they are not a very important yardstick for measuring
the forecast error from the user's point of view.Bibiiothek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtscheft
- 13 -
In the public debate the forecasts of the growth rate of
real GNP attract the highest attention. With respect to this
aggregate the average absolute forecast error is in the
order of .8 percentage points. Only the joint forecast of
the research institutes shows an error which is slightly
higher than 1 percentage point. However, it should be taken
into account that the joint forecast is already published"in
October whereas the individual forecasts are made at the end
of the year. Additionally, there were often minority votes
in years with large forecast errors (1977, 1980 and 1982)
which proved to be much closer to the actual outcome but
were not used to calculate the forecast error. In general,
users of forecasts should not only look at the consensus
forecast. If forecasts are deviating strongly this is a
clear indication that forecast risks are high.
Contrary to widespread prejudices, professional GNP fore-
casts have proved to be quite reliable on average. As com-
pared to naive forecasting techniques they perform quite
well. If for example previous year's growth rate had been
taken to forecast this year's rate, the average absolute
error would have been 2 percentage points, i.e. 2.5 times
higher than the forecast error of the Kiel Institute. In the
case where the forecast had been strictly oriented at the
medium term growth rate the error would have amounted to 1.3
percentage points. Also with respect to time series methods
the expert, forecasts are superior (see Pflaumer, Swart
19.87) . -
Because the assessment of the future development of economic
activity might influence the decisions of the electorate,
professional forecasters are often accused of being overly
optimistic to enhance the chances of reelection of the gov-
ernment which is financing most of the research activities
of the•forecast institutions. On the other hand, forecasters
are sometimes blamed by politicians of being overly pessi-
mistic. However, there is no evidence for such behavior; thei\ ,t.
- 14 -
average forecast errors with respect to real GNP hardly show
any systematic bias (table 1). The average prediction error
is -.05 percentage points for the forecasts of the Kiel
Institute and it shows only a slight overprediction in the
case of the other forecasters. Even the government, which is
probably more inclined to give a rosy forecast, overesti-
mated the annual increase in real GNP by only 0.3 percentage
points on average.
The average absolute forecast error gives an impression on
the overall reliability of a forecast. However, it is also
interesting to investigate whether there are any systematic
errors with respect to cyclical fluctuations. Graph 1 shows
the actual and projected growth rates of real GNP year by
year. It is evident, that the forecasts of the Council of
Economic Experts (SVR) are to a certain degree oriented at
the growth rate of potential output, they tend to understate
the cyclical pattern of the economy. Whereas during the
period 1976 to 1987 the actual increase in real GNP stayed
between 5.6 p.c. and -1.1 p.c. (standard deviation 1.74) the
forecasts by the council only ranged from 4.5 p.c. to 0.5
p.c. (standard deviation 1.34). On the other hand, the fore-
casts of. the Kiel Institute showed a strong cyclical pat-
tern, although staying between 5 p.c. and -1.5 p.c. (stand-
ard deviation 1.97) they slightly overstated it.
With respect to the forecast of special components of GNP
the Kiel Institute's forecast errors were comparatively
small for private consumption, investment and entrepreneuri-
al income. The Council of Economic Experts presented the
most reliable projections for foreign trade and public con-
sumption. In the government's forecast deviations between
forcast and actual increases in consumer prices were rela-
tively small. The joint forecast of the institutes was
superior with respect to forecasts of income from wages and
salaries and the GNP-deflator.- 15 -
Graph 1:
Actual and Predicted Growth Rates of RealGNP
in the Federal Republic of Germany 1976 - 87
86
Change over previous year.- 16 -
A comparison of the forecasts errors of the different compo-
nents shows significant differences. While the average ab-
solute error with respect to the GNP-deflator is less than
0.5 percentage points, it is about 4 percentage points for
investment in machinery and equipment. However, it should be
kept in mind that aggregates like investment or foreign
trade exhibit stronger fluctuations during the cycle than
private consumption. To evaluate the relative forecasting
accuracy concerning different components it is necessary to
relate forecast errors to the standard deviation of the
aggregates. The results of such a standardization are shown
in table 2 for the forecast errors of the Kiel Institute.
The standardized forecast errors range between 33 p.c. and
99 p.c. of a standard deviation. With respect to this crite-
rion, the best forecasts were made for the price level while
export predictions show the highest error. This is a valua-
ble information as to where future work to improve the over-
all forecast should be concentrated.
VII. Evaluation of Forecast Errors
By comparing the forecast errors of different forecasting
approaches over a sufficiently long period of time it is
possible to determine which forecast is on average the more
reliable one. While the comparison provides some hints on
the relative quality of different forecasts it does not
allow any conclusion on whether the forecast with the
smallest error is based on a methodologically sound and
efficient forecasting approach. Therefore, Neumann and
Buscher (1980, 1981) and Kirchgassner (1983) have used the
theory of rational expectations and tested whether the fore-
cast of some selected German forecasting institutions are
unbiased and efficient. However, in this analysis it is not
taken into account that the forecast error may not only
originate from systematic mistakes of the forecasting model- 17 -
Table 2 - The Reliability of the Kiel Institute's Forecasts for Differ-






























































TJased on revised data. - Average absolute error based on revised
data.
Source: CXm calculations.- 18 -
but also from wrong assumptions on monetary and fiscal poli-
cy, on the development of the world economy and on the ex-
change rate, from distortions of the NIA-data, and from
other external factors. In order to improve the forecasts it
is necessary to analyze in detail how these factors have
contributed to the forecast error in the past. Since quanti-
tative assumptions are only available for the Kiel Insti-
tute's forecast we will only refer to this forecast in the
following.
The NIA-statistics provide the necessary data for macroeco-
nomic forecasts. However, as table 3 shows the data are
subject to considerable revisions. These changes affect the
forecasts in two ways: firstly, they change the data-base
which was used to prepare the forecast and secondly, they
lead to a smaller or larger difference between the original
forecast and the outcome. The revisions are made to take
account of information which become available only with a
time-lag or to use the prices of a more recent base year.
With respect to real GNP the revisions amount on average to
about half a percentage point. With respect to single aggre-
gates the revisions are sometimes considerably larger. This
is especially true for changes in stocks. Since the esti-
mates of real GNP are not published separately for the out-
put and the expenditure side, differences show up at first
in the stock variable. When more reliable information be-
comes available, stockbuilding is revised downwards while
the different components of final demand are revised up-
wards; a behavior of the Statistical Office which is antici-
pated by forecasters to a certain degree. This might explain
why for some aggregates forecast errors with respect to the
latest estimates of the Statistical Bureau are lower than
with respect to the first or second (compare table 1) .
Problems concerning data revisions will most likely persist
in the future. However, they could be less pronounced if the
forecasters had more precise information about the methods
the Statistical Office uses for its calculations.- 19 -















































































































































In macroeconomic forecasts it is assumed that weather condi-
tions will be normal. However, in recent years the economy
was strongly influenced by unfavorable or especially favor-
able winter weather. Table 4 shows the likely impact of
abnormal weather conditions on the annual growth rate of
total output. The calculations incorporate only effects of
bad weather on production in the construction sector since
there are no statistics for other sectors. While this tends
to underestimate the effects, it should not be forgotten
that output losses in the construction sector due to bad
weather during winter can be partly compensated in the rest
of the year. To what extent this is possible mainly depends
on the extent of unused capacities.
Table 4 - The Influences of Abnormal Weather Conditions on
Total Output
Weather effect.. Forecast error













Based on statistics of a loss of working days in con-
struction (13% share of total output) due to bad weather,
change over previous year in percentage points. - "Pre-
dicted minus actual growth rate.- 21 -
For these reasons the calculated effects of changes in
weather conditions on total output presented in table 4
should be interpreted rather cautiously. They suggest that
during the period of investigation the maximum effect of
unusual weather conditions did not exceed 0.4 percentage
points of real GNP. A comparison with the Kiel Institute's
forecast errors for real GNP growth shows that unusual
weather conditions can not explain serious prediction
errors.
Finally, macroeconomic forecasts are based on assumptions
concerning the future development of several important
exogenous variables, such as domestic monetary and fiscal
policy, wages and salaries, world output, exchange rates and
oil prices. The short outline of the methodology of the Kiel
Institute's forecast suggests that predictions of the exo-
genous variables are crucial for the accuracy of the fore-
cast. It seems therefore worthwhile to analyze the accuracy
of the underlying assumptions in more detail. Since several
assumptions were formulated only in a qualitative way, we
have to concentrate on those variables were quantitative
assumptions are available. This is the case for the money
supply Ml, the budget deficit, the exchange rate vis-£-vis
the US-Dollar and real GNP of industrial countries.
In general, average forecast errors for the exogenous varia-
bles are not very large (table 5). As compared to the stand-
ard deviation of the actual results, they amount to 6 6 p.c.
for the money supply Ml, 76 p.c. for the budget deficit, 62
p.c. for the exchange rate and 55 p.c. for world output.
However, there seem to be some systematic prediction errors.
With respect to the exchange rate forecast we used to stick
too much to the actual exchange rates; thus there was a sys-
tematic overprediction (underprediction) when the DM was
appreciating (depreciating) . With respect to budget deficits
there seems to be a tendency toward overestimation while











































































































































































Change over previous year in p.c. - Predicted minus4actual value, - indicates underprediction, +
indicates overprediction. - In percentage points. - In p.c. of actual value.- 23 -
Graph 2 shows how prediction errors for the exogenous varia-
bles are related to forecast errors for major variables of
the national accounts, i.e. domestic expenditures, exports
and inflation. With respect to domestic expenditures the
prediction errors can to a considerable degree be explained
by wrong assumptions concerning the development of the money
supply Ml. An overestimation of money growth mostly coin-
cides with an overestimation of domestic demand and vice
versa. On the other hand, prediction errors with respect to
budget deficits seem to be negatively correlated to forecast
errors of domestic demand. This is not surprising because
budget deficits incorporate not only the impulse of fiscal
policy; they also reflect economic activity. If economic
activity is underestimated, tax revenues are also likely to
be underestimated and thus budget deficits will turn out to
be lower than expected.
Forecast errors for exports can be traced back to wrong
assumptions concerning exchange rates and the cyclical
development in other industrial countries. Graph 2 clearly
indicates that the export predictions were too high when the
appreciation of the DM was underestimated like in 1978 and
1986/1987. In 1981 and 1984, the underestimation of real GNP
growth in the industrial countries seems to have contributed
to the underestimation of exports. The openness of the Ger-
man economy also shows up with respect to the forecasts of
inflation. Because of its strong impact on the development
of import prices, an underestimation of the DM/Dollar ex-
change rate also leads to an underestimation of the infla-
tion rate and vice versa.
This evidence suggests that for an improvement of forecasts
it is necessary to pay more attention to the choice of the
underlying assumptions. This analysis of forecast errors for
the exogenous variables is only the first step. Further
steps should be the estimation of reliable policy reaction
functions.- 24 -
Graph 2:
Unexpected Changes of Exogenous
































x. / exchange rate
1976 78 80 82 84 86
^Deviations of assumed or forecast values from actual
value in percentage points except budget deficits (Mill. DM)
and DM /Dollar exchange rate (p.c). -
2Solid line.- 25 -
VIII. Conclusions
Politicians, businessmen, and financial investors have to
plan for the future and try to get some help by using eco-
nomic forecasts. But the future is as uncertain for the
economic forecaster as it is for anybody else. First, he
never knows exactly what the "true" model of the economy is.
Even if his approach did quite well in the past he can never
be certain that it will do so in the future. There may be
structural changes or innovations due to technical progress
or changes in regulations. As a consequence, the model may
become worthless or some adjustments of the relationships or
of the data used may be necessary. Second, for any forecast
he has to make assumptions about the prospective course of
monetary and fiscal policy and about some other exogenous
variables. Thus, the forecast is a conditional one and the
prediction should only become true if the policy assumptions
are correct. If the forecast is correct but the assumptions
were wrong the forecaster was just lucky and his model is
probably defective. If actual events deviate significantly
from the forecast this may be either due to wrong assump-
tions or to shortcomings of the model. Third, when the fore-
cast is made, there is always some uncertainty about the
state of the economy at the time of the forecast. Most data
are only published with a lag and are only preliminary.
Sometimes the forecaster may prepare an outlook without
knowing that the economy has already passed a turning point.
Even if he envisages a turning point in the near future the
forecast error may be quite large because the change in the
direction of economic activity has already occurred. Final-
ly, with respect to past data we are often not on firm
ground. Regular revisions of national income accounts data
due to new information change the cyclical pattern notice-
ably and can lead to significant adjustments of the model
coefficients.- 26 -
Given these uncertainties, macroeconomic forecasts should
not be considered as something that is based on superior
knowledge which is accessible to economists. Economists
rather describe one (or some) possible outcome(s) out of a
large number of other possible developments. And any fore-
cast user is well advised to check out how the forecast
changes if other policy assumptions are used.- 27 -
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Data Appendix - Forecasts and Results
GD = Forecast of the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (joint forecast
of the five leading German research institutes)
SVR = Forecast of the SachverstMndigenrat (council of eco-
nomic experts)
IfW = Forecast of the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft (Kiel
Institute of World Economics)
JWB = Forecast published in the Jahreswirtschaftsbericht
der Bundesregierung (official government projection)
SB1 = First estimate of the Statistical Office (published
in January of the following year)
SB2 = Revised estimate of the Statistical Office (published
in March of the following year)
SB2 = Latest estimate of the Statistical Office (March
1988)
Sources: Compare table 1.
Year-on-year percentage changes.- 30 -








































































































































































































































































































































































Construction investment (in constant prices)
GD SVR IFW JWB SB1 SB2 SB3
1975 -3.50 -3.50 N.A. N.A. -9.30 -9.30 -7.60
1976 0.50 4.50 1.00 N.A. 2.50 2.50 2.40
1977 3.00 2.00 3.50 N.A. 1.60 1.60 1.30
1978 3.50 5.50 3.50 N.A. 4.80 4.90 2.80
1979 5.00 5.50 6.50 N.A. 7.20 7.40 5.80
1980 4.50 5.50 4.00 N.A. 4.90 4.40 2.90
1981 -3.00 -3.00 -4.50 N.A. -3.30 -3.40 -5.10
1982 -5.00 -4.50 -5.00 N.A. -4.90 -4.50 -4.30
1983 0.50 5.00 0.50 N.A. 0.90 0.90 1.70
1984 4.50 7.00 5.00 N.A. 1.50 1.90 1.60
1985 -0.50 0.00 -2.50 N.A. -6.70 -6.20 -5.60
1986 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.50 1.90 2.30 2.40
1987 3.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 -0.40 0.10 0.10
1988 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.00 N.A. N.A. N.A.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gross income of wages and salaries
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
GD
8.50
6.50
9.50
6.00
7.00
7.00
4.50
3.50
2.00
3.50
3.50
4.50
5.00
4.00
SVR
8.00
7.00
9.00
7.00
6.50
7.50
4.00
3.00
2.50
4.50
4.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
IFW
N.A.
N.A.
9.50
6.50
7.00
6.50
3.00
2.00
1.50
4.00
2.50
4.50
5.50
3.50
JWB
8.00
7.00
8.50
5.50
6.50
7.00
3.50
4.00
2.00
3.75
4.25
5.00
4.25
3.25
SB1
4.10
7.20
7.00
6.00
7.20
7.70
4.70
2.40
1.50
3.00
4.00
5.00
3.70
N.A.
SB2
4.10
7.30
7.00
5.90
7.30
7.90
5.00
2.30
1.70
3.00
3.80
5.00
3.80
N.A.
SB3
4.30
7.50
7.10
6.70
7.80
8.60
4.60
2.20
2.00
3.60
3.90
5.10
3.80
N.A.